AN

ESSAY

Towards an

UNION

OF

Ireland with *England*.

Most Humbly offer'd to the Consideration of the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, and Both Houses of Parliament.

Dii Immortales ita vos potentes hujus consilii fecerunt, ut sit Latium deinde, an non sit, in vestrâ manu posuerint. Itaque pacem vobis quod Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum vel sæviendo, vel ignoscendo & potestis. Vultis crudeliter consulere in deditos, victosq; ? licet delere omne Latium : vastas ibi solitudines facere, unde sociali egregio exercitu per multa bella magnaq; sæpe usi estis. Vultis Exemplo Majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in Civitate accipiendo ? Materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditat. Certe id firmissimum longe Imperium est, quo obedientes gaudent.

Camillus ad Senatum Romanum. Liv. lib. 8.

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AN ESSAY TOWARDS An Union of *Ireland* with *England*, &c.

IT is not the Design of this Discourse to examine whether Laws made in *England* ought to Bind *Ireland*; it being sufficient for those of that Nation to know, that this is a Power which *England* Claims, and is able to Vindicate.

But allowing that our Right to this Claim is just, yet surely it has been so put in Execution as to be very grievous and uneasy to that People. Nor is it a small Aggravation in this case, when those who make such Laws, are intended to receive the whole Benefit, Real or Imaginary, that is to Result from them; and those who are to be bound by them, without receiving any Equivalent, are to lye under the whole pressure of their Weight. Hence Complaints arise on one side, and those give grounds of Jealousy to the other. For whoever is put into an uneasy State, is put into an unnatural State, which implies Force, and an unwilling Obedience.

Yet it is not to be denied, but that ſometimes a Government may lye under a Neceſſity of putting almoſt any Hardſhip upon one part of its People, when either the Preſervation, or much greater Good of the Whole, does evidenrly require it. And this may be effected, either by a ſtanding Law, or by a Temporary Act of Violence, which may, notwithſtanding its being violent, be the Cauſe of Safety and Preſervation. But that, even in theſe caſes, the Juſtice of a Government may lye under no reaſonable Imputation: *1ſt*, Such Neceſſity is to be Real and Apparent. *2dly*, It is to be evident, that the Danger apprehended cannot be remov'd, or that the greater Good ſought cannot be obtain'd, by any more equal Terms. *3dly*, Where the ſafety of the Part grieved is equally concern'd with the ſafety of the Whole, then ought the Part griev'd to bear its proportion of the Loſs; but what is more, ought to be made up by the reſt of the Government, according to the nature of the Caſe; for both the Part griev'd, and the reſt of the Government, ow'd their mutual ſafety to ſuch Loſs. *4thly*, Where only one part of the People is prejudic'd by ſuch Law or Act, and the whole Benefit is to accrue to the reſt of the People, in that caſe, without doubt, the Part griev'd ought to have Reparation made to it by the reſt of the People who were Gainers by ſuch Law or Act; otherwiſe ſuch Law or Act will be look'd upon to be an effect of Power and Force, but can never be eſteem'd an Act of Juſtice.

If theſe are Concluſions that flow neceſſarily from juſt Principles of Nature and Reaſon, it as plainly follows, That where ſuch ſevere Laws are made, as are a laſting cauſe of Uneaſineſs, and thoſe juſt Compenſations are not allow'd, the Part griev'd can never willingly acquieſce. Hence muſt ariſe Complaints, an Alienation of Affections,

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and a natural desire of changing such uneasy State for one more easy. And as this cannot but give Jealousy to the Authors of these Uneasinesses; in every such State, that Harmony and mutual Confidence which ought to be between the Parts Governing and Governed, being in a great measure lost, can never produce good Effects in Government.

'Tis then the Design of this Discourse, Humbly to offer such Methods as seem most natural and proper to take away the Cause of Complaint from *Ireland*, and the Jealousy of *England*. And if the Means here propos'd for obtaining such good Ends, will in all other respects be highly Beneficial to *England*, as well as to *Ireland*, by enlarging the Foundation of its Power, Wealth, and Trade, and by strengthning the inward Frame of its Constitution, this will be a further Argument to enforce what we are to offer.

There are three ways of maintaining Conquests or annex'd Governments. By Colonies, unequal Leagues, or by a standing Force. The design of maintaining Conquests or annexed Governments by Colonies, is to avoid the great Expence and Hazard that attends their being maintain'd by a standing Force. From which design it plainly follows, That after Colonies are once settled, and have a Constitution given to them agreeable to that of their Mother Country; they must afterwards be indulged the liberty of making their own Laws, provided they be not repugnant to the Laws of their Mother Country.

The *Romans* indeed gave them another Privilege, and that was to be govern'd by their own Magistrates; and for these Reasons the *Romans* were always most faithfully serv'd by their Colonies; for no alteration could mend their condition. But if Colonies are deny'd the liberty of making their own Laws, and are govern'd by pure

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Subjection, the Nation that sends them out is doubly a Loser. 1*st*, As it is weaker by sending abroad so many of its People. And 2*dly*, Those very Colonies that were intended to keep the Conquer'd or annex'd Country in Obedience, must themselves be kept in Subjection by Force, otherwise they would be apt to Rebel whenever they could find Protection elsewhere. Thus *Platæa* was a *Boetian* Colony, and oppress'd by its Mother Country; the *Platæans* to deliver themselves from Oppression, threw themselves into the protection of *Athens*, who made them free Denizens; in gratitude they ever after follow'd the Fortune of that City, even to their own utter Extermination.

An Absolute Monarch can govern his Superior State, or Provinces, no other way but by Force. Nor in such a Government is there any other consideration had of the People, than to make them subservient to the Designs or Ambition of their Prince. And the People of the Superior State having already lost both Liberty and Property, have nothing to risque from their Provincial Armies.

'Tis very hazardous for a Commonwealth to maintain its Conquests by Force. But then, if it takes this Method, or is under any other necessity of being always in Arms, it must be sure to change its General every Year, and its Armies frequently. While *Rome* continued this Method, it preserv'd its Liberty: but when once it began to continue its Armies for several Years, under the Command of the same Generals; then it lost its Liberty: For this gave their Generals an Opportunity of Debauching and Corrupting their Armies with present Rewards, and hopes of greater; by which means, first *Sylla*, and *Marius*, and afterward the two *Cæsars*, *Julius*, and *Augustus*, set up their own Power, to the Destruction of the Liberty of the Commonwealth.

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But of all Governments, a Free Monarchy is absolutely incapable of Governing its Provinces, or annex'd States, by Force; and must never, either upon the account of its Conquests, or for any other Consideration whatever, put it self under a Necessity of Maintaining a constant Standing Force. For a constant Standing Force being contradictory to such a Constitution, must sometime destroy it. Thus it is that *France*, *Spain*, *Sweden*, and *Denmark*, have lost their Liberties; and so must all Nations that follow the like Methods. For a King being Hereditary General of his Armies, and being the Person that pays, prefers, rewards, and punishes them, there is no sufficient Remedy to be applied to this Mischief. Nor can any one doubt, but that if *England* had preserved its Conquests in *France*, it must have lost its Liberty, as well as its Neighbours.

'Twill follow from this, that a Free Monarchy can never maintain any Conquests (and the reason is the same in a Government only annexed to its Crown) in pure Subjection or Slavery. For all other Methods will be found ineffectual to maintain such a Government, but Force only; and that is a Method that a Free Monarchy can never take, unless it does it by Colonies: But then, as I before observed, those Colonies must be maintain'd in Liberty; that they may think it their Interest faithfully to discharge their Duty, and watch over the Preservation of the Province. But if the Colonies are depriv'd of their Liberty, and govern'd in pure Subjection; it will be no longer their Interest, either to maintain themselves in Obedience, or take care of the Province: and consequently those very Colonies must be kept in Subjection by force. And thus the End of sending them abroad being perfectly lost, it had been much better they had never been Planted.

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Hence it will follow, that either *England* must suffer *Ireland* to live in Liberty, or else they must maintain it in Subjection by a constant Force; and consequently it must maintain that annex'd Government by Methods contradictory to its own Constitution; which is such an inequality as must sometime destroy the Liberty of *England*.

Perhaps an Increase of Prerogative is more tempting to the Ambition of Limited Monarchs, than an Increase of Dominion. For when they compare themselves with those Princes who are more absolute, they are apt to look upon those Fundamental Laws that restrain their Power, to be such Eclipses and Diminutions of their Majesty, as hinder them to exert it with that Lustre, which they believe, becomes the Dignity of their Function: For Kings, like private Men, have sometimes mistaken Appearances for Realities; and not always considered, that what made their Government more easie and gentle, made it at the same time more desirable and lasting.

This Desire and Endeavour to increase their Prerogative, being the common Failing of Princes, 'tis not hard to conceive, that where a King governs several Nations under different Degrees of Liberty, he may endeavour to put those who enjoy a greater Degree of Liberty, upon the same Foot with those who enjoy a less Degree of Liberty: Or, that those Nations, when dextrously managed by a Designing and Ambitious Prince, may become Instruments of Slavery one against another.

These are the Inequalities in our Constitution, which gave some of our Kings Means to push on their ambitious Designs, by playing the Three Kingdoms one against another. And he who will seriously consider the Reigns of those Princes, will rather find a Want of Capacity in the Men, than a Want of real Means to have effected their Purposes.

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Cromwell's Usurpation was at first introduc'd, and afterwards maintain'd by Force. He so united the Three Kingdoms, that during some part of his Government, they were represented by one Parliament. But that Government being perfectly Military, (especially in *Scotland* and *Ireland*) he was not only able to over-awe the Elections, but by open Force, to purge the House, and seclude its Members; as suited best with his Designs. So that his Parliaments being only Nominal, and not at all the Thing it self, as being under a Force; they were neither able nor willing to prejudice him, or relieve the Nation.

But this Union was destroy'd upon the Restoration of K. *Charles* II.; as being directly repugnant to the then Designs in View; which were to extend the Prerogative as far as they could (without running too great a risque); for he was oblig'd to disband the Army, and govern by a Free Parliament. In this case then, the Elections of *Scotland* and *Ireland* had been as Free as those of *England*, and the United Monarchy had been upon the same Foot of Liberty. There then had been no such Inequality in the Government, nor different Interests in these Nations. Whence it is obvious, that till this Union was taken away, those Designs could have had no Ground whereupon to work.

This Union being taken away by K. *Charles* II. gave him first, and afterwards K. *James* II. an Opportunity of extending their Power in *Ireland* almost as far as they pleas'd. For the first Parliament that sat in *Ireland* after the Restoration, thought it made a very good Composition, in Settling a large Hereditary Revenue on K. *Charles*, on Condition that he would give them the Act of Settlement; which seemed to secure the Protestant Interest in that Kingdom. By this means, Parliaments became

almost unnecessary there; and none were call'd for the Space of Seven and twenty Years, immediately preceding the first Parliament call'd by the Late King. So that there being no Check in *Ireland* upon the Government, to stop its Encroachments, 'twas easie for K. J. II. to model *Ireland* so as to make it support him in his Arbitrary Designs here. And indeed he brought *England* so near the Precipice, that nothing less than the great Generosity of our Late King, in undertaking our Deliverance, and his Happy Courage and Conduct in the Prosecution of it, could have broke those Chains that were prepar'd for us.

The different Degrees of Liberty, under which *England* and *Ireland* are govern'd, puts *Ireland* upon a very different Foot from what the Province or annex'd Government of a Free Monarchy ought to be. And this has caus'd such an Inequality in the *English* Constitution, as has, within the Memory of Man, twice endanger'd our Liberty. While Things continue upon their present Foot, the only Precautions that *England* can take to prevent any Danger that may arise to it from *Ireland*, are, 1*st*, To intrust the Government and Army there in the Hands of *English* Men: Or, 2*dly*, To check the Growth of that Kingdom, in point of Trade and Wealth; so that it may not be able to attempt any thing against the Constitution of *England*. We will endeavour to Examine and Try those Remedies, and see whether they are adequate to the Disease.

Such is the Nature of Unkindness, that whoever disobliges another, and continues to do so, must be jealous of his Affection and Friendship, whom he has disoblig'd. And this Rule holds in Governments, as well as among private Men. For this Reason, perhaps, the People of *England* may hereafter think it convenient to have a better

ter Army in *Ireland* than formerly. For, till of late, the Proteſtants of *Ireland* having been well uſed by *England*, it was their viſible Intereſt to maintain their Allegiance and Fidelity inviolable to this Crown; as was plainly ſeen in the Rebellions of 41, and 88. But now, perhaps, *England* may think it convenient to have ſome ſtronger Tye upon the Proteſtants of *Ireland*, than Affection and Allegiance. Thus *England* keeps up a conſtant Force in *Ireland*, to prevent the Miſchief that may ariſe to its Conſtitution from thence. But this Danger proceeds only from this Cauſe; that the King of *England*'s Prerogative is greater there than here; and conſequently he will find it eaſier to influence that, than this Kingdom, to join with him in his Unjuſt Meaſures. But a Standing Army will be ſo far from taking away this Inconvenience, that it will greatly increaſe it. For, without an Army, there will at leaſt be ſome Hazard whether an Ill King will be able to engage that Nation in ſuch Deſigns, or not. But if *England* puts it ſelf upon the Foot of maintaining that Kingdom by an Army, the Dependance of *Ireland* upon their Kings will be ſo Abſolute and Servile, that there will be no room left for Choice; but they muſt blindly give into all the Meaſures that their Kings ſhall think fit to engage them in, however unjuſt, or deſtructive of the Liberties of *England*. Nor does it mend the matter to ſay, this Army ſhall be *Engliſh*.

This was the very Caſe of the two Nations, during the time that the Earl of *Strafford* had the Government of *Ireland*. And the Parliament of *England* thought that the Liberty of this Nation ran ſo great a Riſque from the Army which that Peer kept on foot there, and the other Deſigns which that Army gave him an Opportunity of engaging in; that nothing could ſatisfy them, till he was Attainted, and Suffered. And in a Late King's Reign, the

Hazard from the *Irish* Army was yet greater. Thus we find, that a Standing Army and Arbitrary Power, never took Root in *Ireland*, but the next Step was to transplant themselves into *England*.

The *Roman* Laws and Commonwealth were trampled under Foot by their Provincial Armies. All the Free Monarchies that were lately in *Europe*, have lost their Liberty the same way. *England* has been twice in the greatest Danger from its own, and its *Irish* Armies. If this be Matter of Fact, then certainly *England* must find out some better Method to secure its own Constitution from the Dangers that may again come to it from *Ireland*, than by putting it self, by its own Unkindness, under a Necessity of maintaining that Kingdom by a Standing Force: For this is not to Secure, but to Throw away its Constitution and Liberty. 'Tis indeed the best Doctrine in the World for Tyrants to Preach; but the worst for a Free People to follow.

The next Thing we shall Consider is, Whether to keep *Ireland* Poor, be a Reasonable Security against the Jealousy of *England*?

Self-Love is a Principle so naturally and essentially ingrafted into the Nature of Man, that many who have made as strict a Scrutiny into the Causes and Sources of our Actions as any, seem to make them all Center in that single Point. 'Tis that which mov'd Mankind to give up that Natural Liberty, in which they were Born; because they could find no solid and lasting Security in the State of Nature. 'Tis that which makes wise Men study to preserve the Peace of the Government, under which they live, and are protected; because whatever shakes and endangers that, lessens their own Security and Protection. 'Tis the Fear of Punishment that keeps ill Men in Obedience. 'Tis the Love of Power (which is easily resolv'd

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into the ſame Principle) that fires Ambition. The needy Man ſeeks for Innovation, in hopes to mend his Condition; and he that is obnoxious to the Laws, in hopes to eſcape their Cenſure.

Hence it is, that there would be no one thing found that does not ſeek its own Eaſe, and endeavours according to all that Power, that either Nature or Art has given it, to remove whatever hinders its Enjoyment of it, as being a Violence and Force offered to this Principle. 'Twill follow from hence, that the Poverty that proceeds from the ſeverity of oppreſſive Laws, is ſuch a State in which no Body of People can willingly acquieſce.

Force indeed, or the Fear of a greater Evil, will command an unwilling Obedience; but no longer than while ſuch Force or Fear laſts. And the Reaſon of the thing is confirm'd by the Experience of all Governments, in all Ages (for Nature is always, and every where the ſame,) that no People will acquieſce longer in ſuch a State, than while their cauſe of Fear is greater than their cauſe of Hope. Nay ſo headlong, and blindly are Mankind hurri'd away with this Principle, that they often oppoſe a ſeeming cauſe of Hope, to a real cauſe of Fear.

Thoſe then who are Rich, are watchful to preſerve their Conſtitution, and very hardly engage in any Deſign againſt it; for their cauſe of Fear is greater than their cauſe of Hope. But the Poor and Needy are the proper Inſtruments of Ambition and Tyranny, for their cauſe of Hope is greater than their cauſe of Fear. Hence it is, that an Army of Foreigners is more dangerous to the Liberty of any Nation, than an Army of Natives; for having no Stake, and conſequently nothing to riſque, they can give no ſufficient Security to the Commonwealth, that they will not be ſubſervient to the Deſigns of Ambitious Princes, to the Prejudice of its Conſtitution. From the

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ſame Reaſon, an Army of Natives, whoſe Pay and Hopes are greater than their real Property in the State, is more dangerous than an Army whoſe real Property is more valuable than their Pay and Hopes.

But we muſt be careful to conſider the different Conſtitutions of ſeveral ſorts of Governments; for what we have offered will not be found to work the ſame way, and in the ſame manner in all. In a Government where the Executive part of the Law, and the Legiſlature, are undivided, either in a ſingle Perſon, or in more, there the whole Odium either of Oppreſſive Laws, or of an evil Adminiſtration, falls directly upon the Party governing; there is no Screen between that and the People governed, to intercept their Fury, and break their Reſentment; nor any Security but in a greater Force; which Security can laſt no longer than while the Force continues. When a Revolution proceeds from this Cauſe, if the Supreme Authority be in more than one, it naturally ends in the Loſs of the Conſtitution; but it has not often this Effect in a Monarchy. The reaſon of which Difference we apprehend to be this, That in the former Caſe we impute thoſe Miſchiefs to the very Conſtitution, that does not ſeem to be ſufficiently adapted to the Good of the People; but in the latter Caſe, we are apt to impute them to the Perſon of the King, and hope for a milder Government under his Succeſſor.

And here we are to conſider, that where the Government is thus undivided, either in the hands of one or more, though it be ſevere, yet if it be equal, and impartially adapted to the common good of the People governed, ſuch a Government, as to its inward Frame, ſeems to be fix'd upon a ſolid Baſis. For an impartial Equality takes away, at leaſt, all dangerous cauſe of Complaint. But in a Government where the Supreme Authority is divided,

divided, either between the King and his Nobility, or between the King, his Nobility, and his Commons by their Representatives, we are to consider whether the ill Administration of the Government, or its ill Constitution and Frame, be chiefly to be imputed to such a Council, or to the King: For, where this is to be distinguish'd, in the former Case the Odium will fall upon the Council, and the King will be free: And we have two late Instances in *Sweden* and *Denmark*, where for these Reasons such Councils were by the consent of those Two Kingdoms wholly laid aside, and the Supreme Authority entirely vested in their Kings. But in the latter Case, the Odium will fall upon the King, and the Council will be free: Thus when *Tarquin* was expell'd *Rome*, the Government devolv'd upon the Senate.

I must here, as all along, beg, that my Reader would use me candidly, and interpret favourably what I intend honestly. For those who are hurt, can hardly forbear Complaints; and a Sore must be opened before it can be Healed. Let every one who reads this make the Case his own, and then I appeal to him, Whether the People of *Ireland* can be so lost to the common Passions of Mankind, as really to love and wish the Establishment of that part of the Legislature, which they apprehend to be the Author of their Hardships. Is it not natural for them in that case, to wish the Power that hurts them, less, and the Power that would protect them, greater? And what Mankind wish, they would endeavour to obtain. Can it then be thought, that that is a reasonable way to preserve a Constitution, that makes it the visible Interest of a considerable Body of its People to destroy it? Are Bodies of Men destroyed by making them Poor? or does not their Resentment and Despair increase with their Poverty? Is not the cause of Resentment still the greater, where the People

ple that apprehend themſelves ſo grieved, are no Strangers to thoſe who grieve them, but of their Blood and their Poſterity; a Loyal People, who have never refus'd any extremity of Sufferings in vindication of their Government over them? If the Unkindneſs of a Friend be more bitter than that of a Stranger, and if Mankind generally deſire to ſee the Authors of their Sufferings involv'd in the ſame Misfortunes which they made them undergo; then we believe it is evident, that this Method is ſo far from being a Cure, that it directly qualifies the People of *Ireland* to be fit Inſtruments of Slavery, to be made uſe of by ſucceeding Kings.

The People of *England* have found to their Coſt, that they have had Kings who have thought their own Power too little, and their People's too great; nor are we to preſume that Princes have ſo very lately chang'd their Natures, that we are never to apprehend the like again.

Beſides, were *Ireland* reduc'd to ſuch a State of Poverty and Slavery, it wou'd be the greateſt Encouragement imaginable for our powerful and ambitious Neighbours to deſign that way. And were *Ireland* Invaded under ſuch Circumſtances, they would have but little Power, and leſs Inclination to venture much in their own Defence. For they could not be much worſe by the exchange of Slavery. So that the greateſt Oppoſition that ſuch an Invader wou'd meet with, muſt come directly from hence. And that Province might be loſt before ſuch Succour cou'd be ſent. And ſurely the Preſervation of that Iſland is of too great conſequence to *England* to be ventur'd on a point ſo nice. Eſpecially if we conſider, that we are to apprehend, that the United Powers of *France* and *Spain* will greedily make uſe of all thoſe Advantages that our Diviſions among our ſelves may offer them.

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If then it be no ſufficient Pledge for the Security of the *Engliſh* Conſtitution and Liberty, either to maintain *Ireland* with an Army, or to keep it Poor, it is ſomewhere elſe to be ſought for. And here we Humbly propoſe the Incorporating that Kingdom into the Kingdom of *England*, upon the ſame foot with *Wales*, as an adequate Remedy againſt the Inequalities before taken notice of, as being the only thing that can take them entirely away. And then we ſhall offer ſome farther Reaſons, upon other accounts, to ſhew that this Union will be highly beneficial to the Kingdom and People of *England*, as well as to *Ireland*.

The moſt effectual way to make any Conſtitution firm and laſting, is to make it the viſible Intereſt of the whole Body of the People to preſerve it. By the Body of the People, we not only mean the People of any Superior State, as they are diſtinguiſh'd from the People of its Provinces, or annexed Governments; but we likewiſe include the People of its Provinces and annexed Governments; and ſay, that the Security is ſtill ſo much the greater when it is the Intereſt of the Provinces, *&c.* to ſupport the Conſtitution of the State upon which they depend. For otherwiſe, ſuch States have ſometimes as much to apprehend from their Provinces as from their Enemies. It is ſurely then a great and apparent increaſe of Power and Strength to any State, when a viſible Intereſt has indiſſolubly link'd its Provinces to it. And whereas many great States have been weaken'd and ruin'd by their Provinces, *&c.* this we take to be the perfection of Provincial Government, *&c.* and that which makes them truly a Strength and Bulwark to their Superior State. And can this, in relation to our preſent purpoſe, be more effectually brought about, than by making the Conſtitution of *England* the Conſtitution of *Ireland*?

This will be like that happy Marriage, where tho' the Husband, as Head, really governs, yet the Wife does not seem to obey; for having but one Interest they can have but one Will. Then instead of Unkindness and Jealousies (which are no ways seemly between two Kingdoms so nearly link'd together in Blood and Dependance) there can be nothing but Harmony, Affection, willing Protection, a grateful and chearful Obedience. If any thing then endangers the Constitution of *England*, it will at the same time endanger the Constitution of *Ireland*; and consequently *Ireland*, according to its Power, must be as zealous to preserve the Constitution of *England*, as *England* it self: For they will then be really One.

Thus then, after this Union, the Subjection of *Ireland* to *England* wou'd be the effect of its Choice, and not of Force, because founded in Interest. Nay, it wou'd be so much an effect of its Choice, that were the Offer made to them, they wou'd refuse to be an Independent Kingdom, because the Security and Protection which they wou'd enjoy under the *English* Government after the Union, wou'd much outweigh all the Advantages they cou'd propose to themselves in an Independent State, for they cou'd not protect themselves. Both Nations wou'd be upon an equal foot of Liberty. There cou'd be no different Interest, no Jealousy, nor no Unkindness. Nor cou'd a future King of *England* make any worse use of *Ireland*, towards the effecting his Arbitrary Designs against *England*, than he cou'd of *Devonshire* or *Kent*.

Nor cou'd any one doubt, but that all these good Effects wou'd flow from the Union, who will consider that the Union with *Wales* produc'd the same. *Wales* before its Union, was always either an open Enemy, or an uncertain Friend; since its Union, it has been a most Loyal part of the Commonwealth. *Wales* since its Union, being made

made a part of the *Engliſh* Conſtitution, has been always as zealous to preſerve it, as any part of *England* has been. For the *Engliſh* Conſtitution is their Conſtitution, and the *Engliſh* Intereſt is their Intereſt. And after the Union, the Caſe of *Ireland* muſt be the ſame.

But it was more difficult to Unite *Wales*, than it is now to Unite *Ireland*. For at the time of the Union, the Language, Cuſtom and Laws of *Wales*, were very different from thoſe of *England*; whereas in *Ireland* they are all the ſame. And *Ireland* has already for ſome Ages been acquainted with the *Engliſh* Government. In the buſineſs of the World, we are often guided by Experience as well as by Reaſon. In the Union of *Wales* we had only Reaſon for our guide; in the Union that is propos'd with *Ireland* we have both Reaſon and Experience. Beſides, both in Reaſon and Equity, *Ireland* has a better Plea than *Wales* had. In Reaſon, becauſe the People of *Ireland* are naturally the Offſpring of *England*, the *Welſh* were not; and therefore the *Iriſh* have a better Title to the Portion of a Child. They have a better Plea in Equity, becauſe all the Maſſacres, Wars and Deſolations that the Proteſtants of *Ireland* have undergone, have proceeded from this ſingle Reaſon, that they were the Bulwark and Defence of the *Engliſh* Government in that Iſland, which cou'd never be overturn'd, till they were deſtroy'd. But before the Union, the *Welſh* were Hereditary Enemies of *England*.

Having already ſufficiently prov'd, that the Conſtitution of Free Monarchies is ſuch as cannot bear a conſtant ſtanding Force, which will ſometime deſtroy it; it will follow from hence, That *England* forſakes its Conſtitution, whenever it puts it ſelf under a neceſſity of maintaining a conſtant ſtanding Force. 'Twill likewiſe follow from hence, that *England* muſt find out ſome other method of Maintaining *Ireland*, than by a ſtanding Army; unleſs

we have a mind to make a Present of our Liberty, to our future Kings, as *France*, *Spain*, and other, sometime free Monarchies, have formerly done: Or at best we must be at the same hazard, the same expence of Blood and Treasure, to defend our Liberty, that we were at in the time of King *J.* the 2*d.* whenever any future Oppression shall force us to it. And who will answer for the Success? And indeed Force and Freedom, being in their own Nature inconsistent, can never agree together. There are but two ways of preserving *Ireland*: By Force, if we make it their Interest not to obey; and this is repugnant to our Constitution: Or without Force, if we make it their Interest to obey, and this is not only agreeable to our Constitution, but will greatly strengthen and secure it. And none can doubt but that the Union propos'd is an infallible way to make it the Interest of *Ireland* to obey without Force. If then there are but two ways to preserve *Ireland*, and one of them is repugnant to our Constitution, and the other agreeable to it, the Choice does not seem difficult.

It is apparent from Experience, both in K. *Charles* I. and a Late King's Reign, that a Force in *Ireland* is as dangerous to the Liberty of *England*, as a Force here; the Means of Transporting them being very ready, and always in the Power of a King.

But if any be of Opinion, that tho the Union were granted, there wou'd be a Necessity to keep up an Army in *Ireland*, to preserve it from falling into the Hands of the Papists: We Answer, That this Apprehension is altogether groundless. 'Twou'd be indeed convenient to keep some Foot and Dragoons, to scour the Bogs and Mountains, and keep the Rapparees in order; and maintain a very few Necessary Garisons: But as this Number wou'd be very small, so, for any other Danger, there

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wou'd be no greater Reason to keep up a Standing Force there than here. For there is no Danger to be apprehended from the Popish *Irish*, who can neither keep Serviceable Horses, nor Arms, nor come into any Branch of the Government, Civil or Military; and have but a small Proportion of the Land. The Number of the Protestants are much increased of late; and the *Irish* Forfeitures have greatly enlarged the *British* Property. And tho they were, in all these Respects, in a much better Condition before the late Rebellion, than they are now, or in all Human Probability, can ever be again; yet even then they never could have rebelled, had not the Late King put the Army, Garisons, and the entire Government into their Hands, and disarm'd the *British* Militia through the Kingdom; much less are they in a Condition to rebel now.

The Succession to the Crown being greatly weaken'd by the Unfortunate Loss of our Late Young Prince, in whom the common Hopes of these Nations centred; and the Pretended Prince of *Wales* supported by a Powerful Foreign Alliance; and, as it is to be fear'd, not wholly destitute of Friends among our selves, setting up a Title against our present Establishment; against which the People of *Scotland* openly declared: Perhaps, in such Circumstances, it were convenient that a common Interest might give these Nations but one View.

Thus having shown, that the late Unkindness of *England* is the Cause of the present Uneasiness of both Nations; and that no Free Monarchy can ever govern its Provinces in pure Subjection; for a Province governed in pure Subjection, must either be govern'd with Force, or lost; and the Force that keeps it in Obedience will sometime destroy the Liberty of the Superior State: It being hence evident, that *England* cannot remove these Inequalities,

lities, by keeping *Ireland* in Obedience with a Standing Force, but greatly increase them; such a Force being a Contradiction to its Constitution, that has already twice endanger'd it: Nor will the keeping *Ireland* Poor, remove them; because with their Poverty their Resentment and Despair will increase, and their Poverty will make them fit Instruments of Slavery, to be made use of by succeeding Kings. It being likewise clearly prov'd, that an Union will perfectly take away all these Inequalities, and put *England* upon a Foot of Preserving *Ireland* without a Force. Besides, that it may be convenient now that the Succession of the Crown is so unfortunately weakened, that both Nations had but one Interest, and one View. From all which Reasons, drawn from the Nature of our Constitution, it is hop'd, That the Parliament, which is the Guardian of the *English* Liberty, and our Present Most Gracious Queen, who is not only a true Nursing-Mother of Her common Subjects, but the Greatest Bulwark of the Liberties of Mankind on the Face of the Earth, will think it Her Glory to establish it, by Promoting an Union on such a Foot among Her own Subjects, that it may not hereafter be easily Shaken.

Having done with those Considerations that relate to the Constitution of both Nations; our next Endeavour will be to show, That this Union will greatly increase the Manufactures, Trade, and Shipping of each Nation, consider'd by it self; and raise their Rental: The Consequence of which will be, That this Union will prove a great Increase of Strength and Power to the United Monarchy; and will be the common Interest of Manufacturer, Merchant, Landlord, and of the Monarchy.

The true Way to increase the Manufactures of *England*, consists in Working them truly and cheaply. As for what relates to the Working them truly, we shall pass that

that over, it being no ways material to our present Purpose.

Cheap Manufacturing is effected by Cheapness of Materials, and Cheapness of Labour. As for Cheapness of Materials, we will insist only upon Wooll. And here we are to observe, That the Duty upon Wooll Exported out of *Ireland* into *England*, and the Wooll-Licenses are so considerable, as to make the Wooll of *Ireland*, generally speaking, bear Proportion to the Wooll of *England* in its Price, as 17 is to 25: not that these Duties in themselves are so much in the Price of the Wooll, but these Duties are the Cause why the *Irish* Wooll is kept so low; for the Merchant will be considered for the Duty he pays.

Taking the whole Woollen Manufacture in gross; the Price of Wooll is generally suppos'd to be quadrupled in the Manufacture. So that 25 *l.* worth of Wooll is suppos'd to be worth 100 *l.* when manufactured; and the 75 *l.* is the Price of the Labour.

Wooll being allow'd to be 25 *per Cent.* of the Value of the Manufacture; it undeniably follows, that a Difference of one in 25 in the Price of Wooll, will create a Difference of One *per Cent.* in the Value of the Manufacture.

Hence it is demonstrable, That the *Irish* Wooll bearing Proportion to the Wooll of *England*, as 17 to 25, or which is the same thing, being 8 in 25 cheaper than the Wooll of *England*; the People of *Ireland* can, upon the Account of this Difference in the Prices of theirs and *English* Wooll, sell their Woollen Manufacture 8 *per Cent.* cheaper than the People of *England* can afford theirs, and no more.

While this Difference in the Price of Wooll between the two Nations continues, because of the Duties before taken

taken notice of; it is very plain, that the *French*, *Dutch*, and *Scotch* Smugglers, can give greater Prices for the *Irish* Wooll than *England* can do; and yet bring the Wooll cheaper to their own Countries, than the *English* Merchant can to his. And tho it is certain that the Price of *Irish* Wooll is increas'd to the *Dutch* above what it is to the *French* and *Scotch*, (becauſe the Freight is dearer from *Ireland* to *Holland*, than from *Ireland* to *Scotland*, or than it is from *Ireland* to thoſe Parts of *France* where that Trade is carried on); nor is *Holland* ſo well ſituated to carry on that Trade as thoſe Countries are; yet *English* and *Iriſh* Wooll is, within a ſmall Matter, as cheap in *Holland* as in *England*, and they are plentifully ſupplied with it; if we may give credit to the expreſs Words of Sir *Joſiah Child*, p. 145.

Nor is it in the power of Laws, or Precautions, to prevent this Miſchief, while things continue upon their preſent Foot. For the hope of Profit will always make ſome People more induſtrious to evade thoſe Laws, than the ſenſe of Duty will make others careful to put them in Execution. Nor will it be impoſſible to find little Land-Waiters, whoſe Salary, perhaps, does not reach to 20 *l. per annum*, who will be glad to receive a greater Reward for being out of the way one Night, or one Hour, than the Queen allows them for half, or their whole Year's Salaries. And it will in moſt Caſes be impoſſible, and in all extreamly difficult, to prove ſuch Neglect or Treachery againſt any of thoſe Officers. For it is, now at leaſt, the viſible Intereſt of that whole Kingdom, that either they never ſhould be diſcovered, or if diſcover'd, that they ſhou'd be acquitted.

But ſuppoſe all thoſe Officers Careful and Diligent in the Performance of their Duties; let us calmly and ſeriouſly conſider, how it will be poſſible for them to guard

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ſo great a Tract of Sea-Coaſt, as that of *Ireland*; which is ſo full of Bays, Creeks, and other Places convenient to carry on ſuch a Trade; and which lies ſo open to *France* and *Scotland*. Can all their Diligence be ſuppos'd ſufficient to prevent *French* or *Scotch* open Boats, and other Ships, from coming to appointed Places, and receiving there, in the Night-time, ſuch Quantities of Wooll as ſhall be agreed upon? And Reſentment being now added to Intereſt, thoſe Officers are to expect none, or very ſeldom, Intelligence from the Country, nor any Aſſiſtance; when every Man muſt become Odious in his Neighbourhood who would join with the Officers: and the very Officers who ſhall appear moſt active and diligent, cannot expect to paſs their Time very eaſily.

All the Laws that ever *England* has made, have never been able to prevent their own Owling Trade, tho it be carried on in a ſmall Tract of Sea-Coaſt; and it is a known National Intereſt, that this pernicious Trade ſhou'd be deſtroy'd. Then let every one judge, without flattering himſelf, how much more impoſſible it will be to prevent it in *Ireland*, where the Difficulties under our preſent Conſtitution ſeem inſuperable; and the Conveniences for carrying on ſuch a Trade are ſo many and eaſie; it being but three Hours Sail from ſeveral Parts of *Ireland* to *Scotland*; and a great Part of its Sea-Coaſt lies open to *France*.

And all that Caution in the Act, which obliges the Merchant to give Security that he will import the Wooll ſhipped off in *Ireland* to this Kingdom, will ſignifie nothing at all. For that Trade will be managed chiefly by *French*, *Dutch*, and *Scotch* Ships, and open Boats, in the Night-time; and that without the Privity of the Cuſtom-Houſe Officers. Nor are thoſe Ships (eſpeciallly *Dutch* and *French*) liable to be ſearched by *Engliſh* Ships when at Sea.

 And

And in all respects it is infinitely a greater Prejudice both to the Woollen Trade, and the general Interest of *England*, that Wooll should be carry'd out of *Ireland*, than the Manufacture. For every Sack of *Irish* Wooll carry'd, for instance, into *France*, works up three Sacks of *French* Wooll. So that every Sack of Wooll carry'd out of *Ireland* into *France*, is as great a Loss to the Manufacture of *England*, as four Sacks of Wooll manufactured in *Ireland*, and thence Exported. Besides the great Employment it gives to the Poor of that and other Nations, while the Poor of these Nations become a mighty Burthen to the Landed Men and Housekeepers, for the want of this Employment: The great Increase of Trade and Manufactures that it brings to those Nations, is directly to the Loss of so much to these Nations; and consequently the great Increase of Wealth and Power that this Trade brings to those Nations, is directly to our Impoverishment; whereby upon all Occasions, they become more Powerful to Offend, and we more Feeble to Protect, either our Selves, or Allies.

Besides, the Sack of Wooll manufactured in *Ireland*, and thence Exported, is an Advantage to the Subjects of *England*; and the Wealth so gained must necessarily, in the Course of Time, resolve it self into the Wealth of *England*.

Tho the Wooll in *England*, in gross, is valued at 12 *d. per* Pound; yet we will value the Wooll Imported from *Ireland* at 14 *d. per* Pound. Not that we take the Wooll of *Ireland* to be better than the Wooll of *England*; but because the worst of the Wooll is kept in *Ireland*, for the course Consumption of that Nation.

The Wooll manufactured yearly in *England* at 12 *d. per* Pound, is valued at 2,000,000 *l.* The Wooll that was imported into *England* from *Ireland* in the Year 1698, came

came to 335,574 great Stones; which at 14 *d. per* Pound, was worth 274,052 *l.* and was about $\frac{1}{7}$ Part in Value of the whole Wooll manufactured in *England*.

If it be said, that Mr. *King* computes the Wooll yearly shorn in *England*, to be worth 2,000,000 *l.* and if the Wooll brought from *Ireland* be worth 274,052 *l.*, and the Wooll imported from *Spain* be not worth much less, as probably it is not; it ought to follow, that the Wooll yearly manufactur'd in *England*, is worth 2,500,000 *l.* and this Wooll being quadrupled in the Manufacture, ought to be 10,000,000 *l.*

To this we answer, That allowing Mr. *King*'s Computation to be just, which we have no manner of Reason to question, it ought to be so. But we have met with none who have computed the Wooll manufactured here to be worth more than 2,000,000 *l.*; which being manufactured, is worth 8,000,000 *l.*: So that from these Computations nothing more will follow, but that there is smuggled out of *England* as much Wooll as is imported from *Spain* and *Ireland*, which is yearly worth about 500,000 *l.*

If the Union were granted, and consequently the Duty upon Wooll and Wool-Licenses were taken away; then probably their Prices would bear this Proportion.

The *English*, and other Foreign Wooll imported, being $\frac{6}{7}$ of the Wooll manufactured here, would raise the *Irish* Wooll $\frac{6}{7}$ of the present Difference that is between them. And the *Irish* Wooll being about $\frac{1}{7}$ of the Wooll manufactured here, wou'd lower the *English* Wooll $\frac{1}{7}$ of their present Difference. So that the *Irish* Wooll that is now worth but 17 *l.* would after the Union be worth 23 *l.* and the *English* Wooll that is now worth 25 *l.* would then be worth but 24 *l.* And this Difference in their Prices, tho but small, that wou'd remain between the *English*

and *Irish* Wooll, wou'd be a sufficient Encouragement to the Manufacturer to import it; considering that there wou'd be no Duty paid, and that it wou'd be easier to import Wooll from *Ireland*, than to carry it twenty Miles by Land. But certainly the future Difference would be always just so much, as would be a bare Encouragement for the Manufacturer to import it, and no more.

If it shall be here said, That it is probable the Union may affect the Prices of the Wooll of *England* and *Ireland* in another proportion, *viz.* according to the proportion that the Wooll in *Ireland* in Quantity bears to the Wooll in *England*; we will not dispute the Point against those Gentlemen. This will only make a small variation in our Computation, but will be no Objection against our Argument. According to this Opinion, the Wooll in *Ireland* not being a full Third of the Wooll in *England*, the Union will affect their Prices in this proportion: The *English* Wooll will fall from 25 *l.* to about 23 *l.*, and the *Irish* Wooll will rise from 17 *l.* to about 22 *l.*; for there must always be allow'd such a difference in their Prices, as will be an Encouragement for the Manufacturer to import it.

This Objection being of no great consequence either way, we will proceed upon our first Hypothesis; according to which, the *English* Wooll will fall $\frac{1}{7}$ of the present difference that is between *English* and *Irish* Wooll, or One *per Cent.* in the value of the Manufacture; and the *Irish* Wooll will rise $\frac{6}{7}$ of their present difference, or Six *per Cent.* in the value of the Manufacture. So that from this alteration in the Price of Wooll, *England* will be able to sell its Manufacture One *per Cent.* cheaper than it can now.

Next let us examine the Effects that this Union will have upon those Nations that now smuggle Wooll out of *England* and *Ireland*.

Sir

Sir *Josiah Child* says expresly, That the greatest of this Mischief comes from *Ireland*. By which he means, That there is more Wooll smuggled out of *Ireland*, than out of *England*. Though it weakens our present Argument, we will suppose, That the Quantities of Wooll smuggled out of *England* and *Ireland* are equal: It will follow from what has been said, That these Nations, after the Union, will pay but 24 *l.* in *England* for the same quantity of Wooll that formerly stood them in 25 *l.*; but in *Ireland* they must pay 23 *l.* for the same quantity of Wooll, for which they formerly paid but 17 *l.* P. 146.

Thus then at present, Foreigners pay 500,000 *l.* for Wooll smuggled out of *England* (according to the nearest Computation we can make) and for the same quantity of Wooll smuggled out of *Ireland*, they pay but 340,000 *l.*; so that the same quantity of Wooll that stands *England* in 1,000,000 *l.* (all Charges included) stands Foreigners but in 840,000 *l.*; so that they have it 160,000 *l.* cheaper than *England*.

Here we would have it observed, That we do not value the Freight that Foreigners pay for bringing home their Wooll, nor the Præmium they pay for smuggling it; because that would be much the same After, as Before the Union; only with this difference, That after the Union, it will become the National Interest of *Ireland* to hinder its Wooll from being sent any where but to *England*; and consequently, it will increase the Difficulty and Præmium upon Foreigners.

After the Union, Foreigners will pay but 480,000 *l.* for the same quantity of Wooll which they smuggle out of *England*, and which stands them at present in 500,000 *l.*; but for the same quantity of Wooll which they smuggle out of *Ireland*, and for which they pay now but 340,000 *l.*, they

they must then pay 460,000 *l.*; so that they must then pay 940,000 *l.* for the same quantity of Wooll which they now have for 840,000 *l.*

And the same quantity of Wooll which costs *England* now 1,000,000 *l.*, will then stand them but in 960,000 *l.*

As for the *Dutch*, though it be very well worth their while to steal as much Wooll out of *Ireland* at this time as they can, rather than out of *England*, because they pay there but 17 *l.* for the same quantity of Wooll that will stand them in 25 *l.* here: Yet any one who will consider how much greater the distance is between *Holland* and *Ireland*, than between *Holland* and the *Eastern* Coast of *England*, and consequently, how much more convenient and ready it is for them to smuggle Wooll here, rather than there: We say, one who will consider this, will conclude, That after the Union it can never be worth the while of the *Dutch* to smuggle any Wooll out of *Ireland*; because they must there pay 23 *l.* for the same quantity of Wooll, which they may buy in *England* for 24 *l.* And One in Twenty-four is too inconsiderable a difference in the Price between *English* and *Irish* Wooll, to answer the greater Difference that there is between Freight from *Holland* to *Ireland*, than from *Holland* to the *Eastern* Coast of *England*. And that the Reader may be convinc'd of this, we desire no more, but that he would consider their Situation in a Map.

From hence it will follow, that after the Union, the *Dutch* can smuggle no Wooll from *Ireland*; or, if they do, they will have it considerably dearer than if they smuggled it from *England*. So that whatever they smuggle after the Union, coming from *England*, they must then pay 960,000 *l.* for the same Quantity of Wooll that they now buy in *England* and *Ireland* for 840,000 *l.* So that this Wooll will be rais'd upon them in the Prime Cost 120,000 *l.*

Which

Which being equal to Three *per Cent.* in the value of the Manufacture, it will force the *Dutch* to work Three *per Cent.* dearer than now they do. And *England* being able to sell their Manufacture One *per Cent:* cheaper than they can do now, will force the *Dutch* to sell One *per Cent.* cheaper. So that the alteration in the Price of the Wooll, forcing the *Dutch* to work Three *per Cent.* dearer, and sell One *per Cent.* cheaper, this will be a difference of Four *per Cent.* forc'd upon them.

Though the Wooll of *France* is not fit to be wrought up with the *Spanish* Wooll by it self, without being mix'd with *English* or *Irish* Wooll; yet *France* having considerable Quantities of Wooll of its own, the Alteration that the Union will make in the Price of Wooll in *England* and *Ireland*, will not have so great an effect upon the *French* Woollen Manufacture, as upon the *Dutch*. For they only mixing our Wooll with theirs, their Manufacture will cost them but about One *per Cent.* dearer than it does now; so that this which will have an effect of about Four *per Cent.* upon the *Dutch* Manufacture, will have an effect of about Two *per Cent.* upon the *French* Manufacture.

Next to the Cheapness of Materials, we will consider the Cheapness of Labour; and we will here show how that will be effected by the Union, not only to the great Increase of the Woollen Manufacture, but in general of the whole Manufactures, Trade, and Shipping of the Nation. For then the Prohibition that now lies upon *Irish* Cattle must be taken away.

But some Gentlemen having of late been of Opinion, That if in Favour of that Kingdom we repealed the Prohibition Act, it would be a Compensation to that People for the Woollen Act lately pass'd here, and be a Motive to them cheerfully to submit to it: We think it our duty, so far as lies in us, to set this in a true light, before we

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proceed further in our Argument; it being a thing that we apprehend concerns *England* as nearly as those of that Kingdom.

The Number of the *British* Inhabitants there, is the only sure Pledge we have for the Security of our Government in *Ireland*; and it is as certain that the generality of the Manufacturers there, are Protestants. Both their Manufactures and considerable Towns are supported by their Trade; which consists almost wholly in their Exportation of their Beef, Butter, Hides, Tallow, *&c.* 'Tis plain that these Trades are only a consequence of the Prohibition Act. If then the Prohibition Act were repealed, and the Union not granted, those Trades must certainly fall of course; and not only those Manufactures that are immediately supported by them, but all those that are more remotely carried on by that Affluence of People which those Trades in all their consequences employ in that Kingdom; we say that all those Manufactures must be lost. Nothing then is more plain, than that all those Merchants and Manufacturers must be obliged to forsake that Kingdom, because their means of subsisting there would be destroyed.

The *Scotch* would either return with their Effects to *Scotland*, or, which is more probable, to *Holland*, *New-England*, and *Hamburgh*. The *English* would either return here, or go to the *West-Indies*. Those of the *Irish* Papists, who live by the Woollen Manufacture, as some of them do, wou'd be kindly entertain'd in *France* and *Portugal*, (and we know that many of them have already left *Ireland*, upon the Discouragement of the late Woollen Act, and remov'd into *Scotland*, and other Places not under Her Majesty's Allegiance.) And considering how dangerous an Enemy *France* is endeavouring to be to *England* in the Woollen Trade, and how conveniently *Portu-*

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gal is ſituated, to be ſupplied with Wooll from both *Spain* and *Ireland*; it is hard to ſay, how fatal the Conſequences of this might ſometime be to the Woollen Manufacture of this Nation. Nor is there any doubt to be made, that thoſe of the *Engliſh* and *Scotch*, who would remove to the *Weſt-Indies*, would ſet up the Woollen and Linnen Manufactures there. And as this wou'd greatly leſſen the Exportation both of our Linnen and Woollen Manufactures to thoſe Parts, ſo it wou'd very much leſſen the Dependance that thoſe Plantations have upon *England*. Both which are Points of which *England* ought to be extremely jealous.

And to ſhow that theſe are not remote Fears, we ſhall find that this has been both our Neighbours and our own Caſe upon the like Occaſions. Perſecutions and Oppreſſions have the ſame effect as to our preſent Argument; for they equally drive away the Merchants and Manufacturers of a Country, who are the firſt and readieſt to take Wing.

The Perſecutions in *Flanders* during the Reign of *Philip* the II. deſtroyed the Woollen Manufacture there, and ſo effectually ſet it up here, that they were never able to recover it. The *French* Proteſtants, whom their preſent Perſecution has forc'd to leave their Country, have ſet up all the *French* Manufactures in *Holland*, *Germany*, and *England*. And here in particular, they have either ſet up, or brought to great Perfection the Manufactures of Silver, Silk, Hats, and Stuffs, *&c.* to the irreparable Loſs of that Kingdom.

And in *England*, from the time of King *Charles* the I. to the late Revolution, when ſometimes the Church of *England*, and ſometimes the Diſſenters were oppreſſed, many, particularly of our Woollen Manufacturers, remov'd to *Holland*, *Germany*, and *France*; where they have

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either ſet up, or greatly improv'd that Manufacture, to the no ſmall Damage of this Nation. And if *England* by taking off the Prohibition, and denying the Union, ſhall make it impoſſible for the *Iriſh* Merchants and Manufacturers to ſubſiſt there; it is not to be doubted, but that in all places where they remove, they will ſet up and follow the ſame Manufactures which they follow'd in *Ireland*.

The Merchants and Manufacturers of *Ireland* conſiſt, for the much greateſt part, of its Proteſtant Inhabitants; and if they be driven away by taking off the Prohibition, and denying the Union, *Ireland* muſt neceſſarily, in the courſe of a few Years, return into the Poſſeſſion of its old Proprietors, who naturally love that lazy life of Grazing and Droving; and this might ſometime, and in ſome Conjuncture, prove very fatal to the *Engliſh* Intereſt in that Kingdom. We know how unwillingly they ſubmit to the *Engliſh* Government; and that they never ſtopt at any Barbarity that might enable them to ſhake it off. They have thrown themſelves into the hands of every Popiſh Prince whom they believ'd capable of Protecting them: Witneſs *Spain*, *Lorain*, and *France*. And the latter being of late Years grown ſo greatly Powerful at Sea, beſides the preſent Acceſſion of as many of the *Spaniſh* Ports and Provinces as he pleaſes; *England* ought to be very careful not to let the Popiſh Intereſt increaſe there, and our own grow leſs.

Thoſe things that raiſe the Value of Lands, are Trade, Manufactures, and the Security that any People live in as to their Lives and Fortunes. If the Prohibition be taken off, and the Union not granted, the Merchants and Manufacturers muſt forſake that Kingdom; and this will not only ſink the Value of Land, by deſtroying the Trade of that Kingdom, but by deſtroying the Security of thoſe Proteſtants (who cannot remove from thence) both as

to

to their Lives and Fortunes. For as their Numbers diminish, so will their Security lessen. Thus in a few Years, none of the *British* Inhabitants wou'd remain there, but only such who were obliged by an Indispensible Necessity. More than half of their present Numbers wou'd remove; and those who removed, wou'd consist of the Industrious Part of the Nation. Hence it will follow, That the present Rents of *Ireland* wou'd fall at least $\frac{2}{3}$, and the Purchase of Lands wou'd sink from Fifteen Years Purchase, as it is now generally in *Leimster*, *Munster*, and *Ulster*, to Nine or Ten Years Purchase, as it was before the Prohibition-Act passed here: And in *Connaught*, where the Land is worth Ten or Eleven Years Purchase, 'twou'd fall to Eight, or lower. So that those *Englishmen* who have Purchas'd from the Trustees under the Sanction of our Faith, and of our Acts of Parliament, will have made a Purchase that (considering as well the fall of the Rental of *Ireland*, as of the value of the Years Purchase,) will fall from 20 to 8; that is to say, The Land of *Ireland* that is now worth Two thousand Pounds, will not then be worth above Eight hundred Pounds. And surely our Faith, Honour, and Justice, will oblige us to have a tender regard to those Purchasers.

But abstracted from all these Considerations, we can never believe that we have so far forgot our Posterity in that Kingdom, as to endeavour their utter Ruin and Despair; which it is easy to effect, by taking off the Prohibition, and denying the Union. Nor can we believe that they have ever done any thing since they settled in that Kingdom, to provoke us to such a Treatment.

We believed that this Digression was necessary, though it be tedious: For it having been lately Insinuated, That the taking off this Prohibition wou'd be a Benefit to *England*, and a Favour to *Ireland*; we have laid down the

probable Consequences it wou'd have, both in relation to *England*, and to *Ireland*; lest *England*, through Inadvertency, might take wrong Measures as well in relation to it self as to *Ireland*: And it will occasionally lye in our way to take notice of some more. But we will resume our Discourse.

The Prohibition being taken off, as an Effect of the Union, we presume that the Prices of Flesh and Candles in *England* wou'd for some time fall considerably: The Prices of Butter and Cheese wou'd likewise fall; because *England* after the Union, wou'd be obliged to feed much greater Numbers of Cattle than now it does. So that there being greater Quantities of those Manufactures yearly made here, they wou'd fall in their Prices. Thus the means of Living being made easier, there is no doubt to be made, but that the Price of Labour wou'd fall through *England*. Labour is suppos'd to be ¾ in the Price of the Woollen Manufacture.

Thus then the whole Effect that this Union wou'd have upon the Woollen Manufacture, in respect of *Holland*, stands thus:

The Alteration in the Price of Wooll would force the *Dutch* to work Three *per Cent.* Dearer than they do now.

England, by having its Wooll cheaper, wou'd work One *per Cent.* Cheaper than now: This wou'd be a difference of Four *per Cent.* forc'd upon the *Dutch*.

The fall of the Price of Labour in *England* wou'd enable us to sell our Woollen Manufacture, at least Six *per Cent.* Cheaper than now.

So that upon the whole, by this Union we wou'd force the *Dutch* to sell Seven *per Cent.* Cheaper, and work Three *per Cent.* Dearer; which wou'd be a difference of Ten *per Cent.* forced upon them.

Nor

Nor can the *Dutch* have any Remedy against these manifest Difficulties that the Union wou'd put upon their Woollen Manufacture. The Wooll they have of their own Growth is very inconsiderable; nor can they have any that is good from abroad, but from *Spain*, and these Nations; and they must pay the Market-Prices: Nor is it possible for them to make the Price of their Labour cheaper than it is.

For the Situation of that Country will oblige them always to be at a mighty Expence, as well to keep out the Sea, as to defend themselves against their powerful Neighbours. If they cou'd take away their Excises, then indeed Labour in *Holland* wou'd fall to its Natural Price. But the Support of their Government making it necessary for them to raise their present Taxes, if they take away their Excises, they must raise them some other way. To do this, we can imagine but Two ways: Either to raise them by Increasing their Customs upon Goods Imported and Exported; or to lay them upon Land. The Former they dare not do, for that wou'd ruin their Trade and Shipping all at once; and the Latter they cannot do, for their Land is so loaded already that it can bear no more. And this we affirm upon the Credit of the Judicious Mr. *Lock*, who says in his Treatise upon Money, Trade, *&c.* *P.* 97. " *That though the greatest part of the* " *Publick Charge of their Government be laid upon Trade,* " *yet their Land is so loaded, that in many Places Half, in* " *others a Quarter, in others one Eighth of the Yearly Profit* " *does not come into the Owners Pocket. And if I have not* " *been misinform'd, the Land in some places will not pay the* " *Taxes. So that we may say, that the Charge of the Go-* " *vernment came not upon Commodities, till the Land cou'd* " *not bear it.*

It

It is hereby manifeſt, that the Land in *Holland* can never be brought to relieve them in their Exciſes. And theſe Exciſes being to them of indiſpenſible Neceſſity, will always keep the Price of their Labour high.

Hence it is evident, that either the *Dutch* at this day, are able to ſell all their Woollen Manufacture 10 *per Cent.* cheaper than they do now; or elſe the Union muſt neceſſarily deſtroy that Manufacture. If they are able to ſell that Manufacture 10, nay 5 *per Cent.* cheaper than they do now, what cou'd have hindred them to ingroſs that whole Manufacture, at leaſt from us, through *Europe*? If this had been the Caſe, *England* muſt long e'er this have been obliged avowedly to have ſold their Wooll to the *Dutch*, except what poſſibly we might have kept for our Home Conſumption; for it wou'd have been to no purpoſe, to have kept our Wooll, unleſs we cou'd have wrought it up cheap enough for Foreign Markets.

We will ask our Reader, Whether he believes *Holland* cou'd preſerve any Part of its Woollen Manufacture for Exportation, if the States of that Country wou'd think it fit to lay an Additional Duty of 10, nay, of 5 *per Cent.* upon it, when Exported. And we doubt not, but our Reader will be readily of Opinion, That a Duty of 5 *per Cent.* wou'd moſt certainly deſtroy that Trade. But we have made it plainly appear, That the Union wou'd as effectually lay a Duty of 10 *per Cent.* upon their Woollen Manufacture, as if it were done by a Law of the States.

Thus we preſume it is very evident, That this Union wou'd perfectly deſtroy the *Dutch* Woollen Manufacture, at leaſt for Exportation. And for their Home-Conſumption, they cou'd have no good Wooll but from *Spain*: The *German* Wooll is courſe, and cou'd make Nothing that is Good. So that unleſs it were for its

courſe

course Consumption, they cou'd make nothing for their own Use. As for the finer part of the Manufacture, they wou'd have it much cheaper from us, than they cou'd make it themselves. But if they wou'd think fit to confine themselves by Laws, to the Use of their own Manufacture, that is not in our Power to prevent. Otherwise, by the Union we wou'd most assuredly beat them out of that, by under-selling them at home.

The Wooll yearly smuggled out of *England* and *Ireland*, according to the Price Wooll generally bears in *England*, may be computed to be worth 1,000,000 *l.* Of this, it is reasonable to believe the *Dutch* get one Half; but their Manufacture being destroy'd, this Wooll wou'd be wrought up at Home; for none can imagine that any Nation wou'd steal our Wooll, that cou'd not dispose of the Manufacture. This 500,000 *l.* worth of Wooll wrought up here, wou'd be worth 2,000,000 *l.*; of which, 1,500,000 *l.* being Labour, wou'd be clear Profit to the Nation; besides the Employment it wou'd give to our Poor.

Tho there are very considerable Quantities of Wooll carried every Year out of *England* and *Ireland* into *Scotland*, yet we believe that there is not any great Part of it wrought up there; but is thence carried into *Holland*, *France*, and the *Baltick*: So that of the remaining 500,000 *l.* worth of Wooll that is yearly carried out of *England* and *Ireland*, we may presume, that at least 400,000 *l.* worth goes into *France*. This wrought up here, wou'd be worth 1,600,000 *l.*: But, being mixed with *French* and *Spanish* Wooll, it makes a very considerable Manufacture. For if it be true, which every one affirms that treats of this Subject, That One Part of this Wooll works up Three Parts of *French* Wooll; then does this Wooll in *France* yearly work up a Manufacture of 6,400,000 *l.*

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Tho we know we differ from the common Opinion, yet we do not look upon *France* to be ſo dangerous a Rival to us in our Commerce and Manufactures, as moſt People apprehend; provided that *England*, in Conjunction with its Allies, takes ſuch vigorous Meaſures, as ſhall hinder the *French* King from annexing the *Spaniſh* Monarchy to his own, and from ingroſſing the *American* Trade: For in this Caſe, we know no Power nor Trade in *Europe* that will not be precarious to him. For tho the *French* are good Manufacturers, and of a lively Invention, yet the Difference of our Governments will always give us a Superiority over them.

France is generally brought as an Inſtance, That a Deſpotick Power may grow great in Trade. But whoever will conſider how very much the *French* Manufactures are decreas'd theſe laſt 20 or 30 Years, will find how little Truth there is in this Allegation.

In thoſe days, the *French* Silks, Stuffs, Hats, Stockings, and their Goldſmiths Work, were generally eſteem'd and us'd in *Europe*; and nothing but the Wars, Tyranny, and the Perſecutions of that Government, are the Cauſes why all thoſe Manufactures are either wholly ſet up, or brought to great Perfection, in *England*, *Germany*, and *Holland*.

If the Nature of Tyranny be ſuch, that this preſent King, who has made it his Buſineſs to improve the Trade and Manufactures of his Country as much as poſſible; and who perhaps is as wiſe a Prince as ever ſat upon the *French* Throne; we ſay, that if the Nature of Tyranny be ſuch, that under his Adminiſtration *France* has not been able to preſerve its own Manufactures, how will it be able to recover them, now they are actually eſtabliſhed in its Neighbour Nations? And of theſe Manufactures, a great Share has fallen to the Portion of *England*.

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The Perſecutions of *France* have driven away great Numbers of the Induſtrious part of its Inhabitants. The mighty Armies they have been obliged to keep up, have forc'd Multitudes of their Manufacturers to turn Soldiers: Their Country, within this 20 or 30 Years, is greatly diſpeopled; their Manufacturers leſſened in Number, and oppreſſed with Taxes; and the Numbers of their Poor are highly increaſed. Our Stock employ'd in Trade is very much greater than theirs; and Money more plentiful: The Numbers of our Hands employ'd in Manufactures are increaſed; and our Taxes, compar'd with theirs, are very moderate. All Degrees of People among us are ſecured in their Liberties and Properties: And we have allow'd a Toleration in Religion; by which means we not only preſerve, but increaſe our Hands. None among us, how mean ſoever his Quality is, is afraid either to be, or appear to be Rich; but dares avowedly turn his Money and Stock to all thoſe Advantages that Trade and Induſtry make practicable. Maxims directly contrary to all theſe, have very much decay'd the *French* Trade and Manufactures; and while the ſame Maxims are purſu'd, they will continue to do ſo more and more.

France is at this day engaged in a more deſtructive War than ever before: Humanly ſpeaking, *England* in Conjunction with our great Alliance, will be of Conſideration ſufficient to obtain an equal Treaty of Commerce with *France*. From all which Conſiderations, which we ſubmit to the Judgments of our Readers, we are of Opinion, That if we be not wanting to our ſelves, we may be very well able to deal with *France* in Manufactures and Commerce.

Having premised this, we have already prov'd, That by the Alteration which the Union will make in the Price of Wooll, we shall be able to work One *per Cent.* cheaper than we do now: By the lowering the Price of Labour, we shall work Six *per Cent.* cheaper; and the Price of our Wooll being raised upon *France*, they will be forc'd to work One *per Cent.* dearer. So that they working One *per Cent.* dearer, and we forcing them to sell Seven *per Cent.* cheaper, this will be a difference of about Eight *per Cent.* forc'd upon them.

The *French* Woollen Manufacture consisted chiefly in Stuffs, Hats, and Stockins. As for Stockins, we are able to say nothing, whether ours equal theirs or not: But we are very much misinform'd, if at this day we do not make our Hats rather better than theirs. Their Stuffs we imitate perfectly well; and we have effected one and the other, by the help of their Workmen.

If then we consider the Advantages we have over *France*, both from the Nature of our Government, and the Goodness of our Wooll; we make no difficulty to affirm, That if by the Union we forc'd this Eight *per Cent.* upon them, their Woollen Manufacture for Exportation (except for Stockins; and as to that Manufacture, we have met with nothing that might induce us to affirm or deny any thing) wou'd be wholly lost, or render'd very inconsiderable.

But if *England* be able to obtain an equal Treaty of Commerce with *France*, (and for Reasons before taken notice of, this does not seem a very remote Prospect) and only a Duty of Eight *per Cent.* were laid upon our Woollen Manufacture imported thither; after the Union *England* would be as well able to cope with their Woollen Manufacture, as if the *English* Woollen

Woollen Manufacture were at this day imported into *France* Custom-free. This we presume would oblige them to quit the Woollen Manufacture, which they have lately set up in opposition to ours; and which, if not prevented, may in time have ill consequences.

But the *French* having considerable Quantities of Wooll, tho it be not very good, yet we believe that after the Union, they will be able to supply their own course Consumption; and this, notwithstanding an equal Treaty of Commerce were made with us.

No Nation in *Europe* cou'd be able to make any Advantage of the Loss this Union wou'd bring upon the *French* and *Dutch* Manufactures, but *England* and *Ireland*. *England* wou'd gain thereby very much the greatest Part, (of which more hereafter); yet the little *Ireland* wou'd gain, wou'd be very considerable to it. *England* and *Ireland* wou'd gain just as much as the *French* and *Dutch* would lose. This wou'd be the whole *Dutch* Manufacture for Exportation, and a very great Part of their Home Consumption: It wou'd either be the whole, or by much the most considerable Part of the *French* Manufacture for Exportation; and upon an equal Treaty of Commerce, the finest part of their Home Consumption. Besides, there are other Nations, who at present aim at setting up this Manufacture, who wou'd then be oblig'd to quit their Looms. From all which Considerations, we think it reasonable to conclude, That in no great Number of Years *England* wou'd double its Woollen Manufacture, and this upon a sure Foundation; which as it cou'd give no reasonable Offence to our Neighbours, so it is consonant to all the true Maxims of Trade and Policy.

But when the Union, by increasing the Trade and Numbers of People in both Nations, wou'd in some time bring things to their present Dearness, this cou'd have no ill Effects upon our Trade: For before that cou'd happen, our Neighbours Woollen Manufactures must be destroy'd, and the Hands that they employ in that Trade must come to us. For Things cou'd no other ways recover their present Dearness with us: And we being in possession of the Hands and Stock employ'd in that Trade, it wou'd be then too late for them that rival us now to set up to rival us again. Nor cou'd there ever be any considerable difference between the Prices of *English* and *Irish* Wooll, which has such ill Effects upon our Manufactures, as we have before taken notice of.

Thus in some time the Demand of *England* upon Wooll may reasonably be presum'd to be double what it is at present: But if the Prohibition-Act were repealed, and the Union not granted, *Ireland* wou'd be so far from being able to answer the proportion of this new Demand, that it would not be able to give *England* half of what it now does. For we have already prov'd, *Pag.* 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. (to which, to avoid Repetitions, we refer our Reader) That the taking off this Prohibition, and denying the Union, would drive away Half the *British* Inhabitants with their Effects out of that Kingdom; and those wou'd be the Industrious Part of the Nation; that it would sink the Rents of Land there at least $\frac{2}{3}$; the consequence of which wou'd be, that for want of Labour and Hands, and by the decay of Improvements there, the Produce of the Land wou'd fall near the same Proportion. But the Land that wou'd still be taken care of, wou'd be turn'd in a much greater Proportion than it is now,

to

to feed Black Cattle, rather than graze Sheep; the reason of which is plainly this, They wou'd carry as many of their Black Cattle as they cou'd spare every Year to *England*, and find a ready Market for them. But Sheep are not of so convenient a Transportation.

Thus we believe our Computation modest enough, that *Ireland* cou'd not in this case afford *England* half the Wooll it now does: And there being no place in *Europe*, except *Spain*, that cou'd afford *England* so good Wooll as *Ireland* (and *Spanish* Wooll is only fit for some part of our Manufacture,) *England* must either lose a great part of its Manufacture, or be supplied with worse Wooll, and at dearer Prices from other Nations; and that too precariously, and perhaps under Restrictions, and at a great Expence. And whether it be advisable for *England* to try such uncertain and dangerous Experiments in their Woollen Manufacture, which is the Basis of their Trade and Wealth, rather than put *Ireland*, of which *England* is Mistress, in a condition to supply it with what is both Good and Cheap, and that constantly, and without fear of Restrictions, we leave to the Consideration of the People of *England*.

But the Woollen Manufacture is not the only one to which the Union, by making Labour cheap, wou'd be a Benefit. For this will be a general Advantage to all the Manufactures of *England*, by enabling us to afford them Cheaper; which of necessity wou'd Increase the Vent of *England*, and the Numbers of our People.

There are several Manufactures which the Poor of this Nation cannot follow, because of the dearness of Labour. Such Manufactures are Imported in upon us, while our own Poor want Employment.

There is no doubt to be made, but that *England* has already ſaved vaſt Sums of Money, by making a great part of the Silk Manufacture at Home, which formerly was imported from Abroad. But as an equal Treaty of Commerce with *France* wou'd give us great Advantage in our Woollen Manufacture, ſo it wou'd very much endanger our Silk Manufacture. We have made ſeveral good Laws to encourage our Luteſtring Company: But at length we ſhall find, that we begin at the wrong end, and that it is in vain to ſtrive by Laws to keep this ſo profitable Manufacture among us, unleſs we put our ſelves upon the Foot of working it at leaſt as Cheap as the *French*, *Dutch*, and other Foreign Nations. For if they can afford to Under-ſell us, our Workmen will ſurely leave us, and ſeek Employment with them: And they will run their Manufactures upon us in ſpight of all our Laws, Fleets, and Care to prevent them; ſo ſubtle and violent is the Nature of Trade. But the Union, by taking off the Prohibition, providing greatly for the cheapneſs of Labour, (which is an high Article in this Manufacture) we muſt greatly increaſe in this ſo profitable Manufacture, both for our own Conſumption, and for Exportation, in ſpight of all Arts to Undermine us.

By theſe means the Shipping of *England* muſt be increaſed in proportion, as well for the Importation of Materials, as for the Exportation of our Manufactures: Our Commerce abroad more than doubled; and our Power, Wealth, and Stock, mightily Advanced: Our Cities, Towns, and Villages, wou'd be filled with Induſtrious Inhabitants; and our Poor wou'd find Employment, and become a Strength and Support to the Nation, inſtead of being a grievous Charge and Burthen to us, as at preſent.

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The Demand upon Land in all respects must be greatly Increased, as well to supply our increasing Manufactures, as to feed so great an addition of People as then wou'd be found among us. Besides, our own Poor, when employ'd either in Manufactures, or improving the Land of *England*, wou'd both Feed and Cloath themselves better than they now can do.

Estates which consist in Mines of all sorts, wou'd improve very considerably, both by a greater Home Consumption, and a greater Exportation. Our Home Consumption wou'd be Increased by our Increase of People: And our own Poor being Employ'd, as before taken notice of, would consume greater Quantities of them; and many of them are necessary in our Manufactures, as Iron, Tin, Lead, Coals, *&c.* Our Exportation wou'd Increase, as well because the Number of our Hands employed in the Mines wou'd be Increased, as because the Price of Labour wou'd fall; and consequently we cou'd send abroad greater Quantities, and Cheaper, where either Rivals in Trade, or low Markets, wou'd make it necessary.

The Land of *England* and *Ireland*, under their present Improvement, wou'd by no means answer this great and new Demand that wou'd be made upon it; and therefore it must of necessity be improv'd, still it were able to answer it; and consequently the Rental of both Nations must advance.

The Increase of Trade wou'd Increase the Number of our Land Carriages, and this wou'd Increase the Breed of Horses for Draught and Carriage. The Increase of People wou'd have the same effect upon our Breed of Horses of another sort. This wou'd Increase our Meadow-Land, Pasture, and Corn-Land. And several Countries, particularly of the *North*, that are now Employed

in breeding Black Cattle, wou'd then turn to breed greater Numbers of Horses. Thus a considerable part of *England* that now breed Black Cattle, wou'd be obliged to turn their Hand and Industry to breed Horses.

A much greater Consumption of Flesh, and a large Importation of Black Cattle from *Ireland*, wou'd very greatly Increase the Value of Meadow-Land here. And we must turn much greater Quantities of Land to that use: We must improve a great deal of our Barren Land to be employed in Feeding: And the greatest part of the Breeding Countries of *England* must turn Feeders.

Those of the present Breeding Countries, whose care this shall be, will be great Gainers by the Exchange, because Feeding, in all respects, is much more Profitable than Breeding. 'Tis more Profitable to the Landlord, because it yields a better Rent: 'Tis more Profitable to the Tenant, because he makes a larger, quicker, and more certain Return of his Money: 'Tis more Profitable to the Nation, because they are our Feeding Countries which export our Beef, and have the Manufacturies of our Hides, Horns, and Tallow.

And that this is so in Fact, as well as in Reason, we find that the richest Countries in *England*, and those nearest *London* are Feeding Countries; and those that are very remote, are the Breeding Countries.

All the Land in *England* and *Wales*, whether situated in our present Feeding or Breeding Countries, would be Improved in their Rent and Value, except only such Mountainous and naturally Barren Land as is incapable of any Improvement, or of being turned to any other use than that of Breeding. Such Land would fall in Value for a time, because the Price of Cattle wou'd fall for a time.

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The Yearly Value of the Lands and Mines in *England*, and ſuch other Hereditaments and Perſonal Eſtates as were reached in the Four Shillings Aid, are 14,000,000 *l.* Of this, the Heaths, Moores, Mountains, and Barren Land, are computed to be worth 500,000 *l.* Now certainly the 500,000 *l. per Ann.* of Barren Land, that for a time will fall by the Union, ought not to ſtand in competition with 13,500,000 *l. per Ann.* that will be Improved by the Union.

Nor ought it to ſtand in Competition with the Manufactures, Commerce, and Shipping of *England*.

The Mines and Coaleries of *England* are ſituated in this Barren Land; they will Improve by the Union more than the Barren Land will fall: Nay, probably more than the Yearly Revenue of the Barren Land: But with this difference, that the Mines and all other things that will Improve in *England* by the Union, will continue to Improve: But the Barren Land that will at firſt fall by the Union, will fall but for a time, and afterwards riſe.

The Reaſon of this is, Becauſe after the Union the Prices of Cattle, and all other Things in *Ireland*, will gradually riſe, till both the Prices of their Land, and all other Commodities in that Kingdom, bear a Proportion to the Prices of Land, and of the other Commodities of this Kingdom, of the ſame Nature; chiefly according to its Remoteneſs from *London*, which after the Union, will be the Centre of the Trade of both Nations. Whenever the Prices of the Land, and of the other Commodities of *Ireland* would reach that Value; then, and by the ſame Degrees, the Prices of Land, Cattle, *&c.* that fall after the Union, would again riſe; and as Trade and People Increaſed, they would either reach their old, or a greater Value.

But if the Prohibition were taken off, and the Union not granted, the Value of Land and Cattle that fell in

England and *Wales* by the taking off the Prohibition, would fall yet lower, and could never rise.

We have already proved, *Pag.* 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. to which we must again refer our Reader, That if the Prohibition were taken off, and the Union not granted, at least one half of the *British* Inhabitants, and those of the most Trading and Industrious Part, will be forced to leave that Kingdom, because their Means of Subsisting there will be taken from them. As their Numbers decrease, so the Security of those who must remain, both as to their Lives and Fortunes, will lessen: And they have often drunk deep of the Cruelty of their Enemies there. The Rents and Improvements will greatly decay, and the little Industry that will be left, would be turned to the Breeding of Cattle. As their Poverty, and want of People would become greater, and more sensible, so would the Price of their Cattle Decrease: And as the Importation of the *Irish* Cattle, would at first beat down the Price of the *English* Cattle, so it would continue to do so more and more, till the growing Poverty, and want of People there, had brought them to their lowest Price; and there being no possibility for *Ireland* to retrieve it self under their then Circumstances, it would follow, That the Price of Cattle there can never rise; and that consequently the low Price of Cattle there, and a great Importation here, will always beat down the Price of the *English* Cattle; and then it must follow, That those Countries of *England* and *Wales* that fall in Value by taking off the Prohibition, must fall yet lower, and never rise.

Dearness of Building, and dearness of Freight, greatly prejudice our Shipping and Commerce; both which would be very much remedied by the Union: And we shall find, that these Two are in a great measure the Causes why we have lost so much of our Trade to the *Baltick*,

as

as we have visibly done since the Prohibition. The dearness of Building has a general Influence over our whole Trade: The dearness of Victualling has a particular Influence over our *Eastland* Trades; because *Ireland* lies no ways convenient to ease the *English* Merchant in Victualling for those Parts. And if *England* by the Union would put it self upon the foot of Building and Victualling Cheaper; this added to the other Advantages we would receive in our Manufacturies, and of which we have spoken sufficiently already, would greatly Increase our *Eastland* Trades, and enable us to carry them on more with our Commodities, and less with our ready Money, than we are forced to do at present.

England is more subject to Wars by Sea than Land; in such Wars Victualling is a great part of the Expence. He that is able to carry on a War longest, is likely to end it with greatest Honour and Advantage. And by the Union we could certainly Victual our Men of War cheaper than now: And even in Maintaining our Peace Fleets, this would lessen our Charge very considerably.

Nor can *England* after the Union be in any danger of having its People drained by *Ireland*. And though the whole Tenor of this Discourse sufficiently shows this, yet to satisfy such as may be very scrupulous, we say, That after the Union, the Taxes and Impositions of all sorts in *Ireland* will be the same as they are here: The Value of Land and all Commodities will bear proportion to the Land and Commodities of *England*, as they are more remote from *London*, which must be the Centre of Trade to both Nations.

The People of all Ranks (of Nobility and Gentry we say nothing) live better in and near the Centre of Trade, than in places remote from it, notwithstanding that Provisions and Land are somewhat Dearer. For Money circulates, Markets are quick, and every Industrious Man

thrives, whatever his Profession is, whether Husbandry, Manufactures, or Day-Labour. As to the Husbandman, we will only observe, that in and near great Markets, he can turn his hand to no manner of Improvement, nor can he spare any thing about his House, but what will turn to Account, and bring in the Penny: Whereas in Places remote, he cannot turn his hand to all sorts of Improvements; and many things are lost to a Husbandman for want of a ready Market. Thus we see that the remote Parts of *England* complain, That they are too much drained by *London*, and the adjacent Parts; but none was ever afraid, that the remote Countries of *England* would ever drain *London*, and the adjacent Countries.

But *Ireland* being more conveniently Situated for the *West-India* and *Streights* Trade, Will not the Union endanger the Loss of a Considerable Part of those Trades to *England*?

To this we Answer, That notwithstanding the Situation of *Ireland*, it can never gain any invidious Part of this or any other Trade from *England*, for want of a sufficient Stock. For the Stock of *Ireland* being always and necessarily drained into *England*, it can never vye with them in those, or any other Trades which they shall think it worth their while to follow. But we will Examine this a little more closely.

We shall find, that *London* is much more inconveniently situated for the *Streights*, and *West-India* Trades, than the whole Sea-coast of *England*, and *Wales*, between *Dover* and *Whitehaven* Westward; which in Extent is two Parts in three of the whole Sea-coast of *England*: And tho it may easily be made appear, That *London* alone drives a much greater Trade to those Places, than all the rest of *England* and *Wales* put together; yet besides this Advantage, all the rest of the Ports of *England* and *Wales* Trade to the *West-Indies* and *Streights*, with the same Freedom that *London* does.

But

But *Devonſhire* affords us ſomething extremely remarkable, to evince this Point. *London* buys vaſt Quantities of the Woollen Manufacture every Market in *Exeter*; which are thence carried by Land-Carriage to *London*, about 150 Miles. Theſe Cloaths, among other Places, are ſent from *London* to the *Weſt-Indies*, *Streights*, *Spain*, and *Portugal*. A Ship diſcharged at the Cuſtom-houſe in the Harbours of *Devonſhire*, take Voyages in groſs, is a Month nearer the *Weſt-Indies*, &c. than a Ship diſcharged the Cuſtom-houſe of *London*; and this becauſe of the different Winds which are neceſſary to carry a Ship down the River, and up the Channel. And yet notwithſtanding this mighty Advantage, the People of *Devonſhire* cannot find the way to ſend their Woollen Manufactures in any great Quantities, from their own Harbours to thoſe Places: But *London* has, and always muſt carry away that Trade; for the Stock that *London* employs in Trade, ſo mightily exceeds the Stock of other Places in theſe Nations, that, with relation to them, it is Miſtreſs of, and abſolutely gives Laws to all Markets, both at home and abroad; and conſequently muſt carry away the Trade from them.

The mighty Stock of *London* is the ſole Cauſe why the greateſt part of the Trade of the reſt of *England* conſiſts in being ſubſervient to the Trade of *London*. And to ſhow that it is ſo, For whom is it that the great Manufactures are carried on in the *North*, and in the *Weſt*; but *London*? For whom the Silk Manufactures, but for *London*? For whom are the Mines of *England*, of all Sorts, wrought, but for *London*? And ſo it is of the other Trades of *England*. And this muſt always be the Caſe of *England* as long as *London* continues to be the Center of its Wealth. So this muſt be the very Caſe of *Ireland*, with relation to *England*, after the Union. For as the Wealth of *England* centers in *London*, ſo muſt the Wealth of *Ireland* center

in

in *England*: And as *London* by this means has attained so great a Stock, that it governs all the Markets, and is Mistress of the Trade of *England*; so the Wealth of *Ireland* being always, and necessarily, drained into *England*, *England*, because of the same Superiority of Stock, will always govern the Markets, and carry away the Trade from *Ireland*. And as the chief Trade of the rest of *England* consists in being subservient to the Trade of *London*, so the chief Trade of *Ireland* will consist in being subservient to the Trade of *England*; and consequently *Ireland* notwithstanding its Situation, can never be a Rival to *England*, either in its *West-India* or *Streights* Trade, nor in its Mauufacturies.

Having according to the best of our Judgment shown, how and from what Causes the Union would increase the Manufactures, Commerce, and Shipping of *England*; how it wou'd improve our Mines and Land, and fill our Cities with industrious Inhabitants; we are of Opinion, That in 20 or 25 Years the Rental of *England* and *Ireland*, considered as one Kingdom, wou'd improve at least one Third; and that probably in this proportion. For in about that time, we presume that *Ireland* wou'd have improved so fast as to bear proportion to *England*, as part of the same Kingdom.

Ireland, in Extent, is about half as big as *England* and *Wales*; and taking the whole together, as fruitful. If *Ireland* were united to *England*, 'twould in extent be about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the whole; but probably it ought not to yield above $\frac{1}{7}$ of the Rent of the whole, because of its Remoteness from *London*; in which the Trade of *Ireland*, after the Union, must necessarily center.

The Rental of *England*, including its Mines, and such Personal Estates as were reached in the 4 *s.* Aid, is valued at about 14,000,000 *l.*; the Rent of *Ireland* is worth about 2,500,000 *l.*: We believe we may with modesty affirm,

That

That after the Union, in 20 or 25 Years, the Rental of *England* will rise to 18,000,000 *l. per annum*: But the Rental of *Ireland*, allowing for its Remoteness from *London*, ought to rise to 6,000,000 *l. per annum*. And let every *Englishman* consider what a mighty ease it will be, if we shall be able in future Burthens and Wars to reach 24,000,000 *l. per annum*, instead of 14,000,000 *l. per annum*; which bore, and bears the Weight and Stress of this, and the last War.

The Reason why we presume that after the Union the Rental of *Ireland* will rise 3,500,000 *l.* whereas the Rental of *England*, which is twice as large, will rise but 4,000,000 *l.* is this, because *Ireland* at this day does by no means bear proportion to *England*, as Part of it, but as dependant upon it: And this Proportion will be either higher or lower, according to the Liberty that *England* will allow *Ireland*, or the Restraint it will put upon it. But after the Union it must necessarily rise till it bears proportion to it as part of the same Kingdom, allowance being made for its Remoteness from *London* chiefly. Thus then the Rental of *Ireland* must rise very much faster than the Rental of *England*, till *Ireland* has reached this Proportion, which we presume may be in 20 or 25 Years; and both together will have reached 24,000,000 *l. per annum*. But when once *Ireland* has improved to this pitch, as to bear proportion to *England* as part of the same Kingdom, then the Rentals of both Kingdoms will rise and fall in proportion to one another.

This Increase of Rent in *Ireland*, will increase the Expence of the *Irish* Nobility and Gentry in this Kingdom, in proportion as 2 ½ is to 6; in the same proportion it will increase the Estates that the Nobility, Gentry, and Corporations of *England* have in *Ireland*.

The Increase of Rent in *Ireland* will enable that Country to take off much greater Quantities of all Sorts of Commodities from *England*, whether they are Native or Imported,

ed, than at present it can: For as it increases in Wealth and Numbers of People, so it must increase its Demands upon *England* for all Commodities.

After the Union, not only the Value, but the Species of *English* and *Irish* Money must be the same; and this taking away Exchange, will greatly encourage the *Irish* Nobility and Gentry to live here.

In all future Taxes, *Ireland* must ease *England*, by bearing its proportion; which, considering the present Situation of Affairs, and the difficulty *England* finds to raise Money to support this expensive War, wou'd be a great Relief to this Nation.

Lastly, *Ireland* under its present Circumstances, lies under several Prohibitions and Restrictions; some of which are absolute, and some relative to *England*. The true Effects of these Prohibitions and Restrictions, have been to force that Nation upon clandestine Trades, greatly to the prejudice of both Kingdoms, and to the Benefit of Foreigners; who make good Use of these our Mistakes: Or else they have openly and avowedly forced and turned the Course of the *Irish* Trade and Dealings from this to other Nations. And nothing can set us upon a right Foot in relation to one another, but an Union: For *Ireland* being hereby made into the Nature of a County of *England*, and consequently the Trade and Communication of those Kingdoms being as free and easie as between any two Parts of the same Country, it will naturally and necessarily follow, that the Business and Trade of *Ireland* will be diverted from Foreign Nations, and chiefly confined to *England*. So that *England* will not only regain that Part of the *Irish* Trade which it has lost, and is likely to do more and more, but will likewise put it self into a more full and absolute Possession of the *Irish* Trade, than ever it had or can have under any other Circumstances than those of an Union.

F I N I S.